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Introduction
Women’s garments typically have buttons on the left side with openings
on the right, opposite the orientation of men’s garments. The practice is
clearly a historical relic, with the best explanation being the following:
when clothing designs became standardized, the wealthy women who could
afford buttons did not dress themselves. 1 The servants who dressed them
were more likely to be right-handed, so the buttons were positioned on the
woman’s left to make it easier for servants to manipulate the fasteners. 2
This “button differential” reflects the fact that at one point in time, for the
wealthy female portion of the population, dressing was not a task one did
for oneself.3
Today, the placement of buttons is all that remains of this history.
Clothing styles are simpler and few of us require—or have access to—
assistance in dressing. Men’s valets and lady’s maids are occupations of the
past. Could lawyers someday similarly be made obsolete? Will emerging
legal technology enable lay individuals to resolve legal issues on their own,
without the intervention of an attorney? Is the legal profession doomed?
There is no question that technological advances are changing the
practice of law. Artificial intelligence undertakes legal analysis, apps
generate legal documents, digital search programs uncover relevant
evidence, and dispute systems are migrating online.4 These advances are
reshaping the boundaries between clients and lawyers, with some futurists
predicting a world in which lawyers become increasingly obsolete. While
even the most alarmist commentators agree that the annihilation of the legal
* Assistant Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine School of Law.
Thank you to the organizers and participants of the University of Oklahoma Law Review
Symposium and the University of California Socio-Legal Studies Workshop for their helpful
comments.
1. Megan Garber, The Curious Case of Men and Women’s Buttons, ATLANTIC (Mar. 27,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/the-curious-case-of-menand-womens-buttons/388844/ (“The most reasonable theory [for the difference] has to do with
the fact that, when clothing conventions were becoming standardized, many women did not
dress themselves.”).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part I.

185

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3646497

186

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:185

profession has not yet arrived, some see the “great disruption” as having
begun.5
In particular, commentators argue that legal technology is already
chipping away at the role for lawyers in consumer-focused areas of law,
where legal issues are less complex and less customized legal services
suffice. One such area is estate planning, which scholars frequently
characterize as ripe for disruption by legal technology. 6 In support, several
scholars point to the use of technological interventions that enable lay
individuals to self-draft estate-planning instruments such as wills. 7 Citing
high rates of intestacy8 as evidence of unmet legal need, this popular
narrative suggests that legal technology will decrease the number of probate
lawyers while also increasing access to justice.
In this Article, I take seriously this claim, which is offered as evidence
of the disruptive and democratizing capacity of legal technology. Drawing
on empirical research on civil legal needs and estate-planning behavior, I
interrogate the validity of several assumptions that underlie this claim.
Specifically, I evaluate adoption of estate-planning technologies, client
capacity to identify and describe testamentary desires, issues in defining
the scope of technological interventions, potential challenges in the
enforceability of computer-generated wills, and the ongoing potential need
for legal assistance in estate administration. While some assumptions find
support in existing empirical work, others do not; several others merit
additional investigation.
Drawing on this illustrative example, I identify several themes that
complicate predictions for legal technology’s potential to increase access
to justice while diminishing the legal profession. First, I highlight the
potential of legal technology to reproduce, rather than ameliorate, existing
social inequalities. Second, I note the challenges raised by complete
automation. Finally, I discuss the role of regulatory and doctrinal reforms
in determining the trajectory of legal technology. Drawing on these themes,
the Article advocates for more nuance and empirical grounding in debates
about the future of lawyers and access to justice in the age of disruptive
legal technology.
5. See generally John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How
Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2014).
6. See sources cited infra note 41.
7. Id.
8. Individuals who die without a will are intestate. Intestate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(Westlaw, current through 10th ed., 2014).
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The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide a brief overview of
disruptive legal technologies and the predicted implications for the legal
profession and access to legal services. In Part II, I turn my attention to the
probate context, and consider the potential for disruptive innovation in
estate planning. I first contextualize technological innovations by
summarizing relevant law and current practices. I then describe
technologies that seek to eliminate the need for legal representation in the
preparation of estate-planning instruments. In Part III, I consider the
empirical assumptions that underlie predictions of technological disruption
in probate practice. Drawing on this analysis, I identify several themes in
Part IV that apply to predictions regarding technological disruption more
broadly. These themes suggest that the future of lawyers in the age of
disruptive legal technology is more complicated than some have suggested.
I conclude by urging scholars and policymakers to consider persistent
social and economic realities as they make predictions about the future of
access to justice.
I. Disruptive Legal Technology
Economic instability, competition from alternative sources of expertise,
and globalization all threaten the existing structure of the legal profession.
However, legal futurists suggest that technology has the potential to disrupt
the practice of law even more fundamentally, bringing massive change to
the legal profession and the form and content of law itself. 9 This possibility
has attracted the attention of practitioners, 10 scholars,11 and leaders of the
bar,12 who seek to understand the implications.
9. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 15
(2d ed. 2017).
10. See, for example, the rise of business consultants focused on legal technology (e.g.,
Stuart A. Forsyth, Perspectives from a Legal Futurist: Challenges to the Courts and the Legal
Community, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 913 (2010) (report from the “owner and principal of The Legal
Futurist, an independent consulting practice, providing long-range strategic planning and
visioning services to all components of the justice system”).
11. See, for example, law review symposia dedicated to artificial intelligence and law:
Symposium, Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming
of Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Symposium, Artificial Intelligence,
Technology, and the Law, 69 U. TORONTO L.J. (SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE) 1 (2018); Symposium,
Artificial Intelligence and the Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Symposium, Legal Reasoning
and Artificial Intelligence: How Computers “Think” Like Lawyers, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 1 (2001).
12. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, THE RELEVANT LAWYER: REIMAGINING THE FUTURE OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (2015).
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Making prophecies is a tricky business, 13 and predictions for the future
of the legal profession range from alarmist 14 to optimistic.15 However,
predictions for the overall trajectory of technological disruption in law are
relatively consistent. Underlying—and exacerbating—the disruptive
potential of legal technology is the increasing disaggregation of legal
work.16 This disaggregation creates the possibility for multiple sources of
legal information and services, 17 leading to commodification and increasing
competition. Following Clayton Christiansen’s theory of disruptive
technologies,18 disruption is predicted to begin at the bottom of the legal
market.19 As technologies improve and are able to meet the demands of
other segments of the market, the disruptive technology will spread until it
ultimately becomes dominant. 20
The diffusion of disruption across market segments depends on the
capacity of technologies to meet the needs of clients. 21 Because the higher
echelons of the legal market concern matters of greater complexity and
novelty—where “bespoke” legal services have been the norm—disruption

13. DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE SALMON OF DOUBT 102 (2002) (“Trying to predict the future
is a mug’s game.”).
14. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 273 (2008) (“I expect that there will be significantly fewer lawyers providing
traditional consultative advisory service; and I predict the emergence of new legal
professionals with quite different roles in society. We will witness the end of many lawyer as
we know and recognize them today . . . .”).
15. Albert H. Yoon, The Post-Modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization of
Legal Representation, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 456, 457 (2016) (offering a more “optimistic” take
on the future direction of the legal profession); see also Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can
Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
501, 530 (2017) (finding that areas where legal technology is likely to have only a light effect
on tasks that account for more than half of lawyers’ time).
16. SUSSKIND, supra note 9, at 33.
17. Id. at 36-42.
18. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL ix-xxiv (1997).
19. Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How Technological Change in the
Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553, 565 (2014)
(“[W]e should look for the ways that disruption is coming, or could come, to the lower
segments of the market because that is where true disruptive innovation begins and takes
hold.”); SUSSKIND, supra note 9, at 45.
20. Brescia et al., supra note 19, at 558; Benjamin H. Barton, Technology Can Solve
Much of America’s Access to Justice Problem, If We Let It, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS
TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 459 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016).
21. See SUSSKIND, supra note 9, at 44.
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in this area is anticipated to require more sophisticated technology. Thus,
the potential for disruption varies by area and type of practice. 22
The range of legal technologies with disruptive potential can be arranged
on a continuum, with differing implications for the practice of law. 23 At one
end are new modes of delivering legal information. A basic example is a
static website that publishes legal information. 24 Lexis and Westlaw are
examples of more advanced web-based delivery of legal information,
where the combination of large amounts of data and increasingly refined
search features add value.25 Legal platforms that connect potential clients
to legal service providers might also be placed in this category, although
serving a different function than legal encyclopedias or online resource
information.
Search technologies are also used in e-discovery.26 These technologies
are more disruptive because they automate tasks previously undertaken by
lawyers.27However, the scope of the resulting disruption is limited because
these are tasks generally undertaken by junior lawyers28 who were already
subject to outsourcing.29
Document preparation applications are another form of automation. The
most basic automate the creation of documents at the direction of a human
scrivener. More sophisticated technologies generate documents that are
drafted by a computer algorithm in response to input provided by a human.

22. See Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal
Services, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1846; Yoon, supra note 15, at 468 (“[T]he contribution
of . . . intelligence augmentation technologies varies by practice of law.”).
23. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62
EMORY L.J. 909, 910-12 (2013) (discussing the automation of basic tasks associated with the
practice of law that has already occurred and the disruption yet to come from emerging
technologies); McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 5, at 3046 (tracing the anticipated effect of
technology on several types of legal tasks).
24. Brescia et al., supra note 19, at 569-70 (describing web-based lawyer directories and
legal encyclopedias).
25. Id. at 568 (describing the evolution of the websites’ search capabilities).
26. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 5, at 3047-48.
27. Id.
28. Remus & Levy, supra note 15, at 530.
29. Tanina Rostain, Robots Versus Lawyers: A User-Centered Approach, 30 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 559, 565 (2017) (noting that, in the corporate sphere at least, the functions that
legal technologies are automating are those “that corporations had already moved outside of
law firms and routinized”).
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For example, there are programs that ask clients questions and then
formulate a legal document that accomplishes their stated objectives. 30
Finally, the technologies viewed as having the greatest disruptive
potential perform legal prediction. 31 As these technologies develop, some
scholars argue that they will disrupt not only legal practice, but also the
creation of law. Because the technologies leverage big data and machine
learning, these scholars predict that we will be able to generate law that is
increasingly complex and minutely detailed. 32 Professor Benjamin Alarie
even foresees the creation of a “seamless legal order, which is universally
accessible in real time” and dictates ex ante the application of law to all
possible situations, a phenomenon he terms the “legal singularity.” 33
The role of lawyers in these visionary future worlds varies. Some
commentators emphasize the potential of technologies that remove the need
for attorney intervention, termed “substitutive legal automation.” 34 Taken
to the extreme, this suggests a bleak future for the legal profession. Others
find this vision unlikely, focusing instead on the potential for technology to
enhance lawyers’ capacity through “intelligence augmentation.” 35
Both scenarios, however, predict an increase in access to justice,
although the mechanism through which this is achieved differs. 36 Those
who favor the potential of substitutive legal technology foresee increases
in clients’ capacity for self-help.37 In contrast, others see technology
reducing the costs of legal practice, allowing lawyers to expand their
practices into latent legal markets. 38

30. See infra Part II.
31. Katz, supra note 23, at 912 (commenting on the rise of “the most disruptive of all
possible displacing technologies—quantitative legal prediction”).
32. See, e.g., Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U.
TORONTO L.J. 443, 445 (2016) (predicting the possibility of complete law); Anthony J. Casey
& Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1410 (2017)
(predicting the rise of “microdirectives” in place of rules and standards in law).
33. Alarie, supra note 32, at 446.
34. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal
Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2019) (defining “substitutive legal automation”).
35. Yoon, supra note 15, at 469 (arguing that it is unlikely that technology will enable
litigants to bypass lawyers altogether).
36. See Raymond H. Brescia, What We Know and Need to Know About Disruptive
Innovation, 67 S.C. L. REV. 203, 210 (2016) (describing ways that disruptive technology could
be used).
37. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 20.
38. Yoon, supra note 15, at 469-71.
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Ultimately, however, the disruptive power of legal technology—and its
ability to increase access to justice—will not depend solely on questions of
technological capacity. The regulatory and political environment will
influence the role of technology in legal practice.39 Regulations on the
unauthorized practice of law (UPL), in particular, have the potential to
curtail the development and adoption of technology in law. 40
Thus, there is significant variation in predictions for the ultimate fate of
the legal profession, but broad agreement that technological disruption is
likely to begin in certain practice areas. Those areas viewed as being most
susceptible to disruption involve document preparation for similar,
repeated transactions, and are underserved by the current market. The most
consistently cited example is estate planning. 41 Because probate practice is
characterized as being so well suited to disruption by existing legal
technology, it presents a valuable test case that I take up in the next
Section.42

39. Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 26, 29 (2015).
40. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public?
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2607-08 (2014).
But see Barton, supra note 20, at 457-60 (arguing that some types of disruptive legal
technology have become sufficiently entrenched that they will likely succeed in spite of UPL
regulations).
41. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 5, at 3050 (“Trust and estate planning is already ripe
for . . . mechanization because this area of law has relatively few kinds of forms and unique
factual situations that arise for the large majority of people.”); see also Benjamin H. Barton,
The Lawyer’s Monopoly – What Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3072
(2014) (“The most obvious examples of computerization in legal services are online forms
providers like LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer. These companies provide . . . forms to online
consumers for . . . [inter alia] wills and trusts . . . .”); Brescia, supra note 36, at 213 (“Simple
documents like Living wills and Powers of Attorney can be prepared through the inputting of
data gathered from responses to simple questionnaires.”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big
Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 799 (suggesting the possibility of retailing law, including the
possibility that “[c]hains like Wal-Mart and Tesco can sell wills”). An early summary of
artificial intelligence advances in law addresses estate planning directly. L. Thorne McCarty,
Artificial Intelligence and Law: How to Get There from Here, 3 RATIO JURIS 189, 192-93
(1990).
42. It is for this reason—estate planning’s reputation as an area appropriate for
automation—that I focus on this topic. It is not because I wish to suggest that estate planning
is the area of most significant unmet legal need.
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II. Legal Technology & Estate Planning
Probate has a reputation as something of a legal backwater.43 The practice
leans local; state law governs, state courts have exclusive jurisdiction,44 and
practitioners and local court actors interact repeatedly.45 Probate practice
becomes more cosmopolitan only when large—indeed, after recent tax
reform, very large—amounts of wealth are involved, triggering federal
transfer taxes46 and the multi-jurisdictional administration of complex
holdings. Although it is an area of practice requiring specialization,47 judges’
impressions of the quality of legal representation in this area are middling,48
and popular perception of estate planning lawyers is not much better.49
Despite these opinions of probate practice—or more accurately, because
of them—estate planning is a practice area seen as ripe for disruption by
43. Jack Leonard, Robin Fields & Evelyn Larrubia, Justice Sleeps While Seniors Suffer,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2005, 3:00 AM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/la-meconserve14nov14-story.html (“Probate Court is a legal backwater, the least glamorous branch
of any courthouse.”); see also John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act,
88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1975) (referencing “[t]he low estate of the probate courts”).
44. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299 (2006) (“Among longstanding limitations on
federal jurisdiction otherwise properly exercised are the so-called ‘domestic relations’ and
‘probate exceptions.’”).
45. Leonard, Fields & Larrubia, supra note 43 (“[Probate law] is an arcane world of trusts,
wills and conservatorships that breeds familiarity among judges, attorneys and
conservators.”).
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3)(C) (2018) (increasing the basic estate tax exclusion
amount to $10 million and incorporating cost-of-living adjustments equal to $1.4 million to
exempt estates of up to $11.4 million from estate tax for decedents dying in 2019).
47. Charles I. Stone, The Function of the Lawyer in Estate Planning, 24 WASH. L. REV.
& ST. B.J. 197, 198 (1949) (noting even seventy years ago that practitioners believed “[e]state
planning richly deserves, and increasingly requires, at least a measure of specialization”); see
also Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Specialization, Sources of Certification, AM. B.
ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_comm
issions/standing-committee-on-specialization/resources/resources_for_lawyers/sources_of_
certification/ (last visited May 15, 2019) (providing a directory of contemporary specialization
certification programs, many of which include estate planning).
48. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331 tbl.6 (2011). Because trusts and estates was
combined with tax, even the middling assessments provided are likely positively biased, since
tax implications would suggest larger matters which are typically handled by larger firms and
more specialized lawyers.
49. Leonard, Fields & Larrubia, supra note 43 (“[I]t’s only fuddy-duddy lawyers without
color to their skin who do it. That’s the public perception of probate law.”). But cf. THE
DESCENDANTS (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2011) (featuring George Clooney as Hawaiian estateplanning lawyer Matt King).
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technology.50 While bad news for lawyers who practice in this area, many
view the disruption as forecasting improved access to justice.51 To
contextualize these claims, I first describe the structure of succession law and
current patterns of use. I then describe technology applicable to the estateplanning context.
A. The Laws of Succession and Probate Practice
Only the living may own property; at death, ownership lapses and property
must be transmitted.52 The laws of succession govern these transfers. In the
United States, succession laws are dedicated to the freedom of disposition,
and grant decedents broad authority to direct the distribution of their property
after death.53 This includes the freedom to allocate relative shares of one’s
property and to distribute specific items of property to the individuals,
charities, or entities of one’s choosing. This freedom also encompasses the
inverse: the ability to restrict individuals from inheriting54 or to condition the
receipt of property.55 Together, these freedoms allow decedents to support
dependents, transmit wealth to future generations, comply with religious
mandates, or effectuate more idiosyncratic desires.56
To exercise these freedoms, however, individuals must designate their
distributive wishes in a will or arrange for the transfer of their property
through nonprobate mechanisms. The administration of a decedent’s estate
pursuant to a will takes place in probate court.57 Nonprobate transfers take
place outside of the supervision of the probate court through revocable trusts,
pay-on-death accounts, other will substitutes that rely on beneficiary

50. See sources cited supra note 41.
51. Barton, supra note 20, at 449.
52. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
INHERITANCE LAW 15 (2009).
53. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 1 (10th ed.
2017); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (noting that “the right to pass on
valuable property to one’s heirs is itself a valuable right” and is subject to legal protection).
54. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010) (“A decedent
by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to succeed to property
of the decedent passing by intestate succession.”).
55. See infra Section IV.D.
56. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Choupette, Karl Lagerfeld’s Cat, Has a Million Reasons to
Purr, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/style/karl-lagerfeldchoupette-cat.html (describing Lagerfeld’s plan to leave millions of dollars to his cat).
57. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1109 (1984).
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designation forms (i.e., retirement accounts, life insurance policies), and
joint-ownership arrangements.58
In many cases, estate planning reflects a desire to control not only
distribution but also the process of administration. For example, the desire to
avoid probate—and its attendant fees, costs, delay, and publicity—has long
been a motivator for estate planning,59 even if probate’s supposed ills are not
fully supported by empirical investigation.60 In addition, wills and trusts
allow individuals to nominate or appoint individuals to positions of trust.
Individuals can appoint executors and trustees under wills and trusts,
respectively, to administer and distribute assets.61 Estate-planning
instruments also designate the terms under which these individuals serve.
These terms can have implications that are far-reaching, such as when
business control is at stake. Last, but potentially of great significance, many
individuals use wills to nominate guardians for minor children or other
dependents.
In addition to these functions, estate planning can be expressive. This can
be accomplished indirectly, such as through distributive provisions or
fiduciary appointments. Specific bequest of a financially or emotionally
valuable asset, for example, can express feelings of warmth or appreciation;
disinheritance of a close family member can express the opposite. In addition,
because testators know that individuals will form opinions about them based
on their estate plans,62 they may seek to establish a favorable legacy through
generosity at death. As the author of an early collection of notable wills
writes, “Our earthly possessions are, after all, but life-holdings, and the grace
with which we part with them at the end of life’s journey shows the heart in

58. Id.
59. NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE (1965).
60. David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County,
California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 609-13 (2015) [hereinafter Horton, Partial Defense].
61. Sophisticated trusts may also appoint individuals and entities to advisory positions
that may not be subject to fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust
Protector: A Question of Fiduciary Power – Should a Trust Protector Be Held to a Fiduciary
Standard, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 71 (2010) (describing the use of trust protectors).
62. This is well illustrated by a cartoon depicting a man at a funeral who says, “My eulogy
is, of course, contingent on the will.” Kate Beaton, “My Eulogy Is, of Course, Contingent on
the Will” – New Yorker Cartoon, ALLPOSTERS, https://www.allposters.com/-sp/My-eulogyis-of-course-contingent-on-the-will-New-Yorker-Cartoon-Posters_i9180089_
.htm?UPI=PGS7A30&PODConfigID=8419449 (last visited May 25, 2019) (originally
published in the New Yorker on Feb 28, 2011).
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its least disguised form.”63 Estate-planning instruments can also make
explicit statements, although this is less common in the modern era than
might be expected.64
Individuals who fail to undertake any estate planning forego the right to
all of these benefits.65 Any property not disposed of by will or through
nonprobate transfers is distributed to the decedent’s heirs by operation of the
laws of intestacy. Designed as majoritarian default rules that produce the
wishes of the average decedent, these laws of descent and distribution reflect
a dedication to the freedom of disposition tempered by concerns of
administrative ease and public policy.66
Whether they actually accomplish the desires of a given decedent,
however, will vary. Nonmarital couples and blended families, in particular,
are less likely to be well served by intestacy. Moreover, the probate court will
appoint individuals to administer the estate, which may result in
appointments that are inconsistent with the decedent’s wishes. Finally,
distributions to minors can also be problematic without estate planning,
necessitating ongoing court oversight in some cases.
Thus, estate planning enables individuals to avoid intestacy and direct the
distribution of their property at death, to identify those individuals whom
they want to carry out those plans, and through these terms to offer a final
63. VIRGIL M. HARRIS, ANCIENT, CURIOUS AND FAMOUS WILLS viii (1911); see also
Daphna Hacker, Soulless Wills, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 957, 962 979 (2010) (“[A] bequethal
encompasses the giver’s preferences, decisions, and personality, as well as possibly reflecting
the recipients’ gratitude, disappointment, remembrance, and, hopefully, respect for the giver’s
choice and wishes.”).
64. See Hacker, supra note 63, at 962 (describing historical antecedents of the modern
will that more frequently “included personal and emotional expressions or [were]
accompanied by separate spiritual and ethical instruments and guidance”).
65. The decedent’s failure to engage in estate planning may also be felt by the decedent’s
heirs. See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of How
People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325, 339 (2015) (noting,
from qualitative study of estate planning, that “when there had been advance planning—of
any type—[the families of the decedent] reacted with appreciation”).
66. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 645 (2014) (“In accordance with the principle of freedom of disposition,
the primary objective in designing an intestacy statute is to carry out the probable intent of the
typical intestate decedent—that is, to provide majoritarian default rules for property
succession at death.”); cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in
Search of its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2004) (arguing that intestacy laws
have “become a theoretical grab-bag [with] [s]cholars and lawmakers . . . prepared to
acknowledge the relevance of virtually every conceivable preference—that of the decedent,
that of survivors, that of society—all mixed together in no particular order”).
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testament. However, to do so, these instruments must be valid and
enforceable. Wills have traditionally been governed by a rigid legal regime
that required compliance with several formalities.67 Although holographic
(handwritten) wills have a long history, they are not accepted in all
jurisdictions.68 The typical will is a written instrument that must be signed
and witnessed by at least two competent witnesses.69 These requirements are
designed to serve several functions: evidentiary, channeling, cautionary, and
protective.70 In addition, the testator must have testamentary capacity and not
be acting under the influence of delusion, fraud, mistake, or undue influence.
There is a move in many states to liberalize these requirements, and an
ongoing dispute among scholars as to the favorability of these reforms.71 The
aspect of this topic that merits special attention for purposes of this Article is
the fact that the liberalization of wills formalities lays the foundation for
many technological innovations. The use of many fill-in forms, for example,
would be impossible absent this doctrinal evolution.
Moreover, it is also important to appreciate that nonprobate instruments,
such as revocable trusts and will substitutes, are not subject to the same
formalities requirements. Given the wealth holdings of most Americans and
the widespread use of will substitutes, much more property is now distributed
through nonprobate transfers than through the probate process.72 This shift
can be viewed as increasing access to estate planning by making it easier for
lay individuals to direct the distribution of their property at death without
triggering the legal complexities of wills. However, it also generates potential
pitfalls for decedents who do not appropriately account for probate and
nonprobate property.
B. The Use of Estate Planning
All of us will die and nearly all of us possess something that we believe to
be of value that we would like to pass on when we do, even if our assets are

67. Langbein, supra note 43, at 489 (“The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and
relentless formalism.”).
68. JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 1001-78 tbl.1
(2018) (describing the formal will requirements of each state including acceptance of
holographic wills).
69. Langbein, supra note 43, at 490.
70. Id. at 492-98.
71. See, e.g., id. at 530 (advocating for the adoption of the substantial compliance
doctrine); David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094, 1145 (2015)
[hereinafter Horton, Wills Law] (supporting adoption of harmless error to signature defects).
72. Langbein, supra note 57.
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meager by financial metrics. Despite this, there is surprising variation in the
rate at which individuals engage in estate planning.
Our empirical understanding of estate-planning behavior is incomplete,
hindered by data limitations.73 However, several important themes emerge
from existing studies. First among these is the prevalence of intestacy. While
estate plans offer a number of benefits, many individuals nevertheless fail to
create them.74 The most recent will study found that 40% of the probate
estates opened in Alameda County, California, for decedents who died in
2007 were intestacies.75 Because California is a community property state
that provides nonprobate alternatives for surviving spouses, this number
likely underestimates rates of intestacy in California and nationally.76 Earlier
will studies also document high levels of intestate estates.77
However, will studies are imperfect sources of information because they
underrepresent low-value estates (which avoid probate and are more likely
to be intestate) and overrepresent older individuals (who are more likely to
die and more likely to have wills), both of which likely lead to negatively
biased estimates of intestacy.78 Indeed, a nationally representative survey
found that 68% of respondents reported being intestate, while 20% had a will
drafted by an attorney and another 11% reported having a self-drafted will.79
This is a valuable insight, but it relies on a small sample (n=324).80 The
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a longitudinal study of a nationally
representative sample of approximately 20,000 older adults sponsored by the
73. See Horton, Partial Defense, supra note 60, at 610 (“[W]e know almost nothing about
what happens in modern probate court.”).
74. HARRIS, supra note 63, at vii (“It must not be forgotten that while all men may make
wills, and should do so, yet all men have not done so.”).
75. Horton, Partial Defense, supra note 60, at 627 (reporting that 269 of the 668 estates
studied were intestacies).
76. Id. at 626 (noting that the use of the spousal petition was evident from the
demographic distribution of the probate estates observed).
77. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Christopher J. Walker & Ben Hernandez-Stern, The
Inheritance Process in San Bernadino County, California, 1964: A Research Note, 43 HOUS.
L. REV. 1445, 1453 (2007) (reporting that 171 of 513 probate records from decedents who
died in 1964 in San Bernardino County, California, were intestacies); Robert A. Stein & Ian
G. Fierstein, The Demography of Probate Administration, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 54, 79 (1985)
(reporting that the proportion of decedents who died in 1972 who had estates that underwent
probate in select jurisdictions in California, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Texas who
were testate ranged from 50% to 86% across states).
78. Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic
Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 39 (2009).
79. Id. at 41.
80. Id.
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National Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration,81 offers
a much larger sample, but one that is focused exclusively on Americans age
fifty and over.82 The most recent wave of that survey found that in 2014, just
over 51% of respondents in the top wealth quintile reported having a will,
while the same was true of 50%, 47%, 36%, and 20% of respondents in the
second, third, fourth, and bottom wealth quintiles, respectively.83 All of
which is to say that while we may not know exactly how many Americans
are intestate, it is clearly a substantial portion of the population.
However, it is not a representative portion of the population. For example,
the HRS data indicate a positive correlation between wealth and estate
planning, which is consistent with anecdotal accounts. Other sociodemographic factors associated with estate planning include education, race,
marital status, age, and family structure.84 Descriptive85 and multiple
regression results86 find that whites are more likely than individuals of other
races or ethnicities to have estate plans, as are individuals with college or
greater educational attainment. Experience of major life events, including a
change in health or financial status, is also associated with an increase in the
probability of adopting an estate plan, even after adjusting for other sociodemographic characteristics.87
Thus, while we lack comprehensive data on the prevalence of intestacy, it
is clear that unequal take-up of estate planning both reflects and replicates
existing social inequality. Many scholars see technology as offering a
solution.
C. Technological Innovations in Estate Planning
It is against the backdrop of widespread need and limited—and unequal—
use of legal services that predictions of technological disruption in estate

81. About, HRS: HEALTH AND RETIREMENT STUDY, https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/about (last
visited June 20, 2019).
82. Welcome to the Study!, HRS: HEALTH AND RETIREMENT STUDY, http://hrsparticipants.
isr.umich.edu/ (last visited June 20, 2019).
83. Russell N. James III, The New Statistics of Estate Planning: Lifetime and PostMortem Wills, Trusts, and Charitable Planning, 8 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 25
tbl.11 (2015) (describing the use of wills and trusts across various socio-demographic
characteristics, but unfortunately not providing an overall rate).
84. Id. at 18, 37-38.
85. Id.; DiRusso, supra note 78, at 43, 49.
86. Lance Palmer, Vibha Bhargava & Gong-Soog Hong, Will Adoption and Life Events
Among Older Adults, 15 FIN. SERV. REV. 281, 291 tbl.3 (2006).
87. Id. at 282.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3646497

2019]

THE FUTURE IS BRIGHT COMPLICATED

199

planning are offered.88 In this Section, I describe the interventions most
frequently referenced in these predictions, which are aimed at lay individuals.
There are several technological innovations designed for use by estateplanning attorneys,89 such as those that run calculations to optimize
transactions from a tax perspective, generate accounts for estates and trusts,90
and partially automate drafting. The use of artificial intelligence will also
likely expand in the future to assist lawyers in making legal determinations.
However, it is substitutive technology that is frequently presented as having
the potential to put probate lawyers out of business while simultaneously
increasing access to law.
In general, these legal technologies fall on a continuum from static
information to predictive analysis.91 Online information about estate
planning is widely available. Static fill-in forms have existed for years, and
in some states are even provided for free by statute.92 Apps that assist or
automate drafting and administration represent current emerging
technology.93 More complex automation or analytics have not yet been
realized in this context.
The technologies that are the focus of current commentary are interactive
drafting aids. These programs, which are most commonly offered online, ask
88. It is important to note that lack of legal action is not necessarily indicative of unmet
legal needs. Rebecca L. Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs
of the Public, 67 S.C. L. REV. 443, 451 (2016) (distinguishing between justiciable situations
that do not require legal intervention and unmet legal needs). While formal estate planning
offers the testator greater certainty that his or her wishes will be carried out, this may not be
necessary for all individuals, particularly if their estates may be handled informally. Cahn &
Ziettlow, supra note 65, at 329 (reporting finding from qualitative study of estate
administration that in the informal administration of intestate estates families may be guided
by the testator’s oral wishes).
89. Jamie J. Baker, 2018: A Legal Research Odyssey: Artificial Intelligence as Disruptor,
110 LAW LIBR. J. 5, 13 (2018) (“To date, expert systems have been developed for use by
attorneys working in bankruptcy, immigration, estate planning, food and drug safety, and
securities matters.”).
90. Quicken Fiduciary Accounting Templates, ACTEC FOUND., (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://actecfoundation.org/quicken-templates/.
91. See infra Part I.
92. Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Will Methodologies—Incorporated Forms vs. Fill-In
Forms: Rivalry or Peaceful Coexistence?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 232, 243-44 (1990). Another
proposal is to incorporate estate planning into the tax-return filing process. Reid Kress
Weisbord, Facilitating Homemade Wills, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 395 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016).
93. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY
OF US LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES (2019), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/
documents/report_us_digital_legal_tech_for_nonlawyers.pdf.
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testators several questions and then provide a fill-in form to draft a will or
trust. RocketLawyer and LegalZoom are the leading players in this area. 94
Programs vary in the level of assistance and customization provided.95 While
greater interaction may increase the quality of the final product, it may also
increase the likelihood that courts will find these programs to be instances of
UPL.96
III. Empirical Assumptions
The suggestion that estate planning is ripe for disruption by this
technology relies on several empirical assumptions. These include
assumptions about mobilization, capacity, and ability to resolve boundary,
enforcement, and administration issues. In this Section, I describe these
assumptions and evaluate them in light of existing empirical evidence. I
conclude that even if we assume that UPL enforcement does not prevent the
adoption of these technologies, it is not clear that they will expand access to
estate planning to the extent predicted by many accounts. Similarly, it is not
clear that more advanced technologies based on artificial intelligence will
overcome human limitations and behaviors that curtail potential increases in
access to justice.
A. Mobilization: Assumptions About Barriers to Estate Planning
Visions of expanded access to estate planning through legal technology
rely on several assumptions about why so many individuals are currently
intestate. These assumptions are not well supported by existing evidence on
civil legal needs. In particular, these visions ignore inequalities in access to
online resources, overestimate the role of financial cost, discount the
significance of psychic costs, and ignore popular understanding of estate
planning as the domain of lawyers.

94. Kristen E. Killian, The Long Tail and Demand Creation in the Legal Market, 11
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 157, 173 (2015).
95. LegalZoom, for example, offers customers a choice between drafting without
assistance and upgrading to a bundled plan that includes a subscription to a legal-services plan
that covers a thirty-minute consultation. Pricing Options, LEGALZOOM, https://www.
legalzoom.com/personal/estate-planning/last-will-and-testament-pricing.html (last visited
May 16, 2019).
96. Lauren Moxley, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to
Reforming the Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
553, 558 (2015); Maria A. Vida, Legality of Will-Creating Software: Is the Sale of Computer
Software to Assist in Drafting Will Documents Considered the Unauthorized Practice of Law?,
41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 232-33 (2000).
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1. Internet Access, Web Use, and Digital Literacy
Initial challenges to predictions of expansive web-based legal assistance
are accessibility and usability limitations. Although the majority of
Americans have internet access, not all do.97 Moreover, many Americans rely
on smartphones for internet access,98 and may incur data costs that make
them infeasible for accessing legal services.99 In addition, individuals’ digital
and general literacy may inhibit their use of web-based legal technologies.100
As Rebecca Sandefur notes, a further limitation of web-based estate-planning
resources is that individuals have to seek them out and be “able to distinguish
good sources from bad.”101
In sum, as research from the United Kingdom on the expansion of
electronic delivery of government services highlights, potential users may
range from those who have “no willingness to engage with online
services . . . to those who exhibit willingness but lack ability . . . to those who
might be considered ‘expert’ users.”102 This highlights the need for realistic
assessments of the proportion of individuals who are likely to adopt and
benefit from self-help technology.
Scholars such as Benjamin Barton acknowledge these concerns, but argue
that self-help technology remains the best way to expand access to justice.103
Certainly, if we lack the will and resources to expand access to justice in
other ways, anything may be better than nothing.104 Yet we should be realistic
97. Lee Rainie, Internet, Broadband, and Cell Phone Statistics, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Internet-broadbandand-cell-phone-statistics.aspx.
98. Id.
99. See CATRINA DENVIR, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, UNIV. COLL. LONDON, ASSISTED
DIGITAL SUPPORT FOR CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM USERS: DEMAND, DESIGN, & IMPLEMENTATION
25 (Apr. 2018), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/cjc-report-on-assisteddigital-support.pdf (reporting on UK studies finding that data costs inhibited use of
smartphones to access government services delivered digitally).
100. Rebecca Sandefur, Bridging the Gap: Rethinking Outreach for Greater Access to
Justice, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721, 736 (2015) [hereinafter Sandefur, Bridging the
Gap]; REBECCA L. SANDEFUR ET AL., LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS: REPORT OF THE SURVEY
OF US LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES 11-14 (2019), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/
cms/documents/report_us_digital_legal_tech_for_nonlawyers.pdf.
101. Sandefur, Bridging the Gap, supra note 100, at 737.
102. CATRINA DENVIR, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, ASSISTED DIGITAL SUPPORT FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM USERS: DEMAND, DESIGN, & IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2018).
103. Barton, supra note 20, at 444-45 (acknowledging the limitations of technological
assistance but heralding it as the “best bet” for addressing inequalities in access to justice).
104. But see infra Section IV.C (questioning the relative benefits of self-drafted will and
intestacy).
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about the extent to which technology will actually address unmet legal needs,
particularly among those who are unlikely to benefit from technological
interventions. Barton points out that increased use of self-help technology
may free up resources that can be devoted to those most in need of traditional
forms of legal assistance.105 However, it is also possible that the availability
of in-person assistance will decline as technological innovations become
established.
2. Financial Cost
Much of the perceived potential of legal technology to increase access to
justice is based on its ability to reduce costs.106 Those who believe in the
potential of substitutive legal technology for estate planning argue that costs
can be reduced or even eliminated by removing the involvement of an
attorney. In this case, the link to increased access to justice depends on an
assumption that cost is a significant—or even the most significant—barrier
to accessing legal representation. The validity of this assumption is
questionable.
We have limited evidence of the role of cost in dissuading individuals from
undertaking estate planning, but the best existing study found that only 1%
of respondents listed cost as the reason for lacking a will.107 This is consistent
with empirical evidence on civil legal needs more generally, which finds that
cost is not the barrier to legal representation that it is assumed to be.108
3. Psychic Costs and Avoidance
The following suggests two points: (1) reducing cost will not necessarily
increase use of estate planning as dramatically as anticipated, and (2)
something other than cost must explain the high rate of intestate decedents.
A popular suggestion is that individuals refrain from engaging in estate

105. Barton, supra note 20, at 444-45.
106. This assumption is found in many, if not most, writings on the potential benefits for
access to justice. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 34, at 7 (“The most promising versions of
legal automation are targeted at people who need and deserve—but cannot afford—an
attorney.”).
107. Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison of Iowans’ Dispositive Preferences
with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041,
1077 tbl.10 (1978).
108. Sandefur, Bridging the Gap, supra note 100, at 722; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, To
Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: Is That the Question¸ 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 875, 900 (2008)
(showing that survey results from several countries suggest that “income has relatively little
impact on decisions to seek the assistance or advice of a lawyer”).
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planning because of the psychic cost of pondering one’s demise.109 This is
consistent with empirical work finding the prevalence of procrastination as a
reason for respondents’ lack of wills.110
An article recounting the legendary design firm Ideo’s attempt to develop
an app called After I Go, reports that the app’s original designer realized that
“he couldn’t just build the right tool; he also had to build the motivation to
do the job in the first place. . . . [T]he work After I Go needed to do was no
longer rational but emotional.”111 Initially intended to facilitate estate
planning and administration, plans for the app became more ambitious before
it ultimately failed.112 The story highlights that technological innovations
face the same psychological barriers as traditional forms of estate planning.
4. Desire for Legal Expertise
Finally, substitutive legal technology may also face a cultural barrier
stemming from the broad understanding of wills as legal documents. For
many civil legal problems, people do not seek legal assistance because they
do not perceive the problem they are experiencing as a legal problem.113
Paradoxically, estate planning may have the opposite problem: lay
individuals are too aware that estate planning requires legal documents, and
may believe that estate planning is a legal matter best undertaken by lawyers.
Reid Kress Weisbord points out that individuals frequently engage in
estate planning, but in the form of nonprobate beneficiary designations.114 He
argues that it is because people view the “will-making process as unfamiliar,
highly technical, burdensome, and expensive” that they don’t undertake it.115
This suggests that to be successful, legal technology must overcome
109. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 53, at 64 (“Some people put off making a will to
avoid the unpleasantness of confronting mortality.”).
110. Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 107, at 1071. But cf. Reid Kress Weisbord,
Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 899 (2013)
(pointing out that similar concerns do not appear to apply to nonprobate transfers).
111. Jon Mooallem, Death, Redesigned: A Legendary Design Firm, a Corporate
Executive, and a Buddhist-Hospice Director Take on the End of Life, CAL. SUNDAY MAG.
(Apr. 5, 2015), https://stories.californiasunday.com/2015-04-05/death-redesigned.
112. Id.
113. Pascoe Pleasance, Nigel J. Balmer & Stian Reimers, What Really Drives Advice
Seeking Behaviour? Looking Beyond the Subject of Legal Disputes, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL
SERIES, no. 6, 2011, at 1, 11, http://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/viewFile/56/227
(documenting increase in planned advice-seeking when problems are identified as legal);
Sandefur, Bridging the Gap, supra note 100, at 725 (attributing difference in observed rates
of legal-advice-seeking, in part, to perceived alegality of problem faced).
114. Weisbord, supra note 110, at 899.
115. Id.
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individuals’ hesitation of wading into what is broadly understood as technical
legal territory.
B. Boundary Problems
A second set of empirical assumptions deals with technology’s ability to
address boundary problems. When discussing disruptive technology and the
great potential it offers for increasing access to estate planning,
commentators frequently limit their claim to the preparation of “basic wills.”
That is, an application that generates wills can substitute for legal
representation so long as what the individual needs is a basic will.116 But what
defines a basic will? Further, is a lay person—or an algorithm—able to
determine whether or not a basic will is what is needed?
A slightly different type of boundary problem arises from the divide
between probate and nonprobate assets. As noted above, most wealth is now
transferred via nonprobate mechanisms, leaving little to be transferred by
will. Comprehensive estate plans account for this complexity in allocating
expenses and distributions. Relatedly, effective estate plans consider not only
the allocation of expenses and distributions across assets, but total assets
relative to total bequests. Testators often intend for residuary legatees (those
who take any assets remaining after payment of costs and specific bequests)
to be the largest beneficiaries; this intent is frustrated if the estate is
insufficient. These issues are becoming increasingly important given rising
levels of personal debt. If self-help technology is going to replace lawyers, it
must be able to address them.
Ray Brescia has discussed boundary problems with regard to disruptive
technology and access to justice more generally. As he points out, “an
approach that provides one-size-fits-all services without an appropriate
screening process to identify potential complicating factors runs the risk of
surrendering important rights.”117 Thus, for substitutive legal technologies to
succeed in the estate-planning context, they must be able to address the needs
of all potential customers, or accurately distinguish those who can be served
from those who cannot.
C. Client Capacity: Identifying and Expressing Desires
The primary objection to current technological interventions in estate
planning is the concern that the instruments delivered will be of insufficient
quality to meet the needs of clients. Is legal technology capable of enabling
116. Yoon, supra note 15, at 465 (discussing the potential for emerging technology to
automate tasks such as “the preparation of a basic will”).
117. Brescia, supra note 36, at 216.
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a lay person to draft a will that effectuates the individual’s testamentary
desires? Will the individual know whether the legal tech has succeeded?
One empirical assumption underlying predictions of the rise of disruptive
estate-planning technology is that clients can accurately identify and describe
their testamentary desires, either on their own or with technological
assistance. Because there may be a significant lapse of time between drafting
and death, circumstances are likely to change.118 Thus, testators need to
formulate not only their immediate, but also their contingent, desires. The
resulting estate plan also must function effectively even as the value and
identity of assets owned by the testator change. Relatedly, testators must
decide how much flexibility they will incorporate into their estate plan versus
how much dead-hand control they hope to exert. The extralegal significance
of each of these decisions is easy to appreciate (imagine the potential family
disruption resulting from one sibling being disfavored relative to another or
the forced sale of a family heirloom to pay expenses that were poorly
allocated). Not surprisingly, many testators strive to optimize soft goals like
family harmony and fairness.119
This reality presents several challenges for technological interventions.
First, it means that the technology must elicit an accurate and comprehensive
set of client preferences, which likely requires some amount of education and
explanation for the testator. Because of the personal nature of these
preferences, probate practice requires open communication.120 Indeed, to
comply with their professional responsibilities, estate-planning lawyers are
directed to meet personally with clients at the start of the representation.121
In addition, the soft goals that many clients seek to optimize are harder to
logically code than hard goals like tax minimization. Engaging in this form
of optimization requires an understanding of family dynamics. This type of
emotional intelligence is not a strength of even the most sophisticated
118. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 53, at 325.
119. Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 65, at 331, 337 (describing “mak[ing] things fair” as an
overarching goal of probate in most families).
120. Stone, supra note 47, at 198 (“I know of no comparable opportunity for combining
on the broadest sort of base the personal, the practical, and the purely legal phases of the
relationship between lawyer and client . . . .”); Do It Yourself Estate Planning, AM. B. ASS’N
(Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/real_property_trust_estate/resources/
estate_planning/diy_estate_planning/.
121. AM. COLL. OF TR. & ESTATE COUNSEL, THE ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 61 (5th ed. 2016) [hereinafter ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON
THE MODEL RULES] (“In order to obtain sufficient information and direction from a client, and
to explain a matter to a client sufficiently for the client to make informed decisions, a lawyer
should meet personally with the client at the outset of the representation.”).
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emerging technologies.122 Moreover, wills’ status as a boundary object that
must serve multiple purposes across several audiences—the testator, legal
actors, family members and friends, and society more broadly—makes it all
the more challenging to construct.123
Thus, there is reason to suspect that technological interventions may not
yield estate plans that meet testators’ needs, but empirical evidence on this
point is limited. Critics reference scathing reviews of existing programs, and
caution against the “false sense of security” they provide.124 In contrast,
proponents argue that there are many satisfied customers of online willpreparation programs. However, legal services are credence goods, meaning
that non-experts are incapable of assessing the quality of the services they
receive.125 Many users of self-drafting programs likely lack sufficient legal
knowledge to assess whether the will they have created achieves their
testamentary desires.
Moreover, any flaws in the will are most likely to become apparent after
the testator’s death. Some scholars have highlighted the paucity of legal
claims filed against the providers of self-drafting will programs for UPL that
allege actual harm.126 Yet we would not expect to see lawsuits alleging harm
122. Cassie Werber, The Five Most Important New Jobs in AI, According to KPMG,
QUARTZ (Jan. 8, 2019), https://qz.com/work/1517594/the-five-most-important-new-ai-jobsaccording-to-kmpg/ (predicting that with the increase in artificial intelligence, new roles are
likely to focus on humans’ ability to be “compassionate, empathetic, to have emotional
intelligence”).
123. See Susan Leigh Star, The Structure of Ill-Structured Solutions: Boundary Objects
and Heterogeneous Distributed Problem Solving, in 2 DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
37 (Les Gasser & Michael N. Huhns eds., 1989) (introducing the concept of “boundary
objects”).
124. Rania Combs, LegalZoom vs. Lawyer: What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You, RANIA
COMBS ATT’Y AT LAW (May 24, 2010), https://texaswillsandtrustslaw.com/2010/05/24/
legalzoom-vs-lawyer-what-you-dont-know-can-hurt-you/ (reporting on the experience of a
licensed attorney who generated a flawed will using Legal Zoom and noting that experience
“provides a glimpse at how even an educated consumer may be lulled into ‘peace of mind’ by
a document with significant flaws”); see also Rob Graham, Empty Cache: When Legal Forms
Frustrate Testamentary Intent, NEV. LAW., Jan. 2015, at 26; Legal DIY Websites are No Match
for a Pro, CONSUMER REP. (Sept. 2012), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/
magazine/2012/09/legal-diy-websites-are-no-match-for-a-pro/index.htm [hereinafter Legal
DIY Websites].
125. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 968 (2000) (describing legal services as credence
goods).
126. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for Online
Providers of Legal Services, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 541, 544 (2015); Rhode & Ricca, supra note
40, at 2592.
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from faulty wills until the testator has died. Moreover, for an action to arise
at that point would require that the beneficiaries who were harmed (1)
realized the problem, (2) had standing to sue, and (3) were motivated to sue,
perhaps after having to challenge or construe the will. Thus, these are likely
not the best measure of success for these legal technologies.
Instead, we need better assessments of how these technological
interventions fare in practice, undertaken while testators are alive and able to
describe their testamentary desires.127 Professional regulation affords
consumer protection through quality control and the imposition of liability.128
If technological interventions are not going to be subject to this form of
control, then perhaps self-testing of the kind described might form part of the
novel regulatory regimes offered by some scholars as an alternative to UPL
restrictions.129 If made public, such accuracy rates could at least provide
consumers with additional information on which to select among competing
providers.
However, these analyses—even if undertaken rigorously and
objectively—must contend with a further empirical issue: defining the
appropriate comparison. Critics of self-drafting will programs point out ways
in which the work product of an estate-planning lawyer would be superior to
that of a lay individual using legal technology.130 However, proponents argue
that the appropriate comparison is not a will drafted by an estate-planning
specialist, but one drafted by an individual without any assistance.131 A
further possibility is to compare the result of a self-drafted will against the
distribution mandated by the laws of intestacy; because these default rules
come into play when an individual dies intestate and are designed to

127. For an example of a preliminary study focused on statutory wills, see Beyer, supra
note 92. For a discussion of how empirical evidence is necessary to resolve debates about
estate-planning reforms, see Horton, Wills Law, supra note 71, at 1101 (discussing the
“impasse” between formalists and reformers that arose in the absence of empirical evidence
“about the law’s real-world impact”).
128. See Remus & Levy, supra note 15, at 545. The issue of liability for the actions of
legal technology is another important consideration. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Path of
Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 45, 52 (2015).
129. Susan Saab Fortney, Online Legal Documents and the Public Interest: Using a Public
Access Approach to Balance Access to Justice and Public Protection, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 91
(2019).
130. See sources cited supra note 22.
131. Legal DIY Websites, supra note 124 (reporting that specialists retained to review wills
prepared using software found that while the wills prepared using the software were not as
good as those that would be prepared by a specialist, they were better than those generated
without any assistance).
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implement the preferences of the average testator, it seems reasonable to
expect legal technology to improve on this outcome. 132 Yet, the identity of
the appropriate control group remains unsettled, as is our understanding of
the effectiveness of existing interventions.
D. Validity and Enforceability
An additional concern raised by technological interventions into estate
planning is the legal validity and enforceability of the resulting instruments.
To be valid, testators must execute estate-planning instruments in accordance
with required formalities; for wills, this generally includes signing in the
presence of two witnesses.133 Doctrinal reform in some states may offer relief
for errors in execution,134 but execution remains so important—and
potentially problematic—that lawyers who prepare documents should
oversee their execution to ensure compliance with professional
responsibilities.135 “[I]n some jurisdictions supervision of the execution of
estate-planning documents constitutes the practice of law . . . .”136
Wills and other estate-planning instruments are also invalid if the testator
lacks the requisite capacity.137 Estate-planning lawyers have a responsibility
not to draft instruments for individuals who lack capacity, and can also assist
clients who do have capacity to protect against later challenges. In contrast,
technological interventions that do not incorporate assessments of
testamentary capacity may generate invalid instruments and offer no
protection against later challenges.
Finally, estate-planning instruments are unenforceable to the extent that
their provisions violate public policy.138 For example, courts will not enforce
conditions that restrict a transferee’s opportunities for marriage or encourage

132. Put another way, this would require that the technology at least do no harm!
133. See infra Section II.A.
134. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010) (adopting the
harmless error rule).
135. ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES, supra note 121, at 15.
136. Id. at 16.
137. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (requiring that testators be of “sound mind”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003) (describing the requirements of mental capacity to make a donative transfer).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 (AM. LAW INST.
1983) (noting that donative transfers are conditioned with a restraint on personal conduct void
if contrary to public policy or illegal).
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divorce.139 Estate-planning attorneys should advise clients on these matters;
existing technological interventions may not.
It is true that these issues represent a challenge to any self-drafted will. If
unassisted self-drafted wills are the appropriate comparison, technological
interventions may not fare any worse. However, if the claim is that legal
technology will disrupt this area of practice by substituting for the services
of lawyers, then each of these issues represents a legitimate concern.
E. Estate Administration
Finally, it is important to note that wills are given effect only at death when
presented to the probate court. Court appearances are one of the areas viewed
as least susceptible to technological disruption.140 Thus, before we write off
probate lawyers entirely, we might also consider their role in estate
administration. Nonprobate transfers and informal estate administration have
removed many cases from the probate court docket,141 decreasing this need.
Yet, as a result, probate courts are increasingly devoted to contested
matters,142 in which legal representation is likely even more important.143 If
estate-planning instruments that testators self-draft with technological
assistance are more likely to be contested or to require construction than other
instruments, legal technology may have the unintended consequence of
increasing legal needs in estate administration. Whether this is the case is an
empirical question on which we lack systematic data.
IV. Implications
This Article has focused on will-preparation programs because they are
frequently cited as an example of disruptive legal technology successfully
increasing access to justice. However, the analysis suggests several themes
that are relevant to predictions of the future of the legal profession and access
139. Id. § 6.2 (providing that restriction on first marriage in a donative transfer is void if it
“unreasonably limit[s] the transferee’s opportunity to marry”); id. § 7.1 (stating that donative
transfers encouraging separation or divorce are invalid).
140. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 5, at 3042 (“[B]ecause machines will not speak in
court for the foreseeable future, oral advocates will continue to enjoy a lucrative niche . . . .”).
141. See, e.g., Horton, Wills Law, supra note 71, at 1121-23 (noting how informal probate
practices reduced the probate court docket in Alameda County, California).
142. Horton, Partial Defense, supra note 60, at 611 (describing the prevalence of contested
matters, “quasi-adversarial” matters, and creditors’ claims in a sample of probate estates).
143. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational
and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 909, 924 (2015)
(finding that lawyers’ ability to navigate complex procedures—as in litigation—does much to
explain the association between legal representation and improved case outcomes).
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to justice in the age of artificial intelligence more broadly. Together, these
themes complicate many existing predictions, which largely “exist at the
extremes.”144
To develop predictions that are more realistic, scholars must account for
the interplay between technology and structural social inequality. As Frank
Pasquale writes, “Our legal system exacerbates inequality because of uneven
access to resources for advocacy, not lack of automation.”145 While
automation may have the potential to expand legal services to markets that
are currently underserved,146 development of these technologies is driven by
the market.147 To the extent that servicing consumer-law needs remains
insufficiently profitable, technologies that might address these needs are
unlikely to be generated. Even if they are, adoption represents a further
challenge that must be overcome for legal technology to succeed.148
This relates to a second theme, which is the tension between complete
substitution and technological augmentation. As other scholars have pointed
out, even document review—another area frequently hailed as perfect for
automation—requires training and human intervention in close cases.149 Is
substitutive technology truly likely to become more feasible, profitable, and
better for clients than augmentative technology? What are the potential
additional unintended effects of substitutive technology?150 Perhaps a more
realistic prediction is the expanded use of non-lawyers interacting with legal
technology to expand access to legal services. This would build upon the
increasing recognition of the potential for non-lawyer providers to meet
client needs151 and for technology to enhance human productivity.
144. Remus & Levy, supra note 15, at 556.
145. Frank Pasquale, Automating the Professions: Utopian Pipe Dream or Dystopian
Nightmare?, L.A. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 15, 2016), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/automa
ting-the-professions-utopian-pipe-dream-or-dystopian-nightmare/
(reviewing
RICHARD
SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS (2016)).
146. Yoon, supra note 15.
147. Remus & Levy, supra note 15, at 551 (“[W]e should remain cognizant that without
regulation, the development and adoption of legal technologies will be driven by the market—
a decidedly ineffective means of ensuring access.”).
148. Id. at 541 (noting that the pace of technological disruption depends on “advances in
natural language processing while the pace of adoption would depend on client pressures”).
149. Id. at 517.
150. Balkin, supra note 128, at 57 (describing what he terms the “substitution effect”).
151. See, e.g., REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS:
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESEARCH REPORT 3 (2016), http://www.
americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/new_york_city_court_navigators_report
_final_with_final_links_december_2016.pdf; Deborah Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services
by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 214-15 (1990).
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Finally, the case of consumer-focused technological interventions in estate
planning highlights the significance of not only professional regulation but
also doctrinal law for the future of legal technology. Professional regulation
is recognized as a threat to the emergence of new technologies.152 However,
these are not the only relevant gatekeeping provisions.153 Self-drafting will
programs could never have taken hold without earlier doctrinal reforms, and
their ongoing success is similarly dependent on the development of doctrinal
law governing execution, construction, and administration of estate-planning
instruments.
Although these themes are drawn from the example of relatively low-tech
self-drafting programs for wills, they are likely relevant for emerging
technologies as well, although they manifest differently. For example,
massive computing power and big data might facilitate personalized default
rules for intestacy.154 Artificial intelligence would identify patterns of
testamentary intentions and then generate individualized default rules that
would be more likely to represent the testamentary desires of a given
decedent. This could expand access to justice in the sense of improving
outcomes for decedents who forego or are unable to undertake estate
planning during life.
However, even this technologically sophisticated approach is not free
from the empirical complexities identified in this Article. First, the
stubbornness of social inequality would likely be evident in ongoing patterns
of intestacy (which decedents’ estates were subject to the personalized
default rules) as well as the content of the individualized intestacy laws
themselves. Probabilistic preferences would be developed from a corpus of
data that is itself a function of existing social structures. Family structure,
wealth, gender, race and ethnicity, education, and religion all likely
contribute to testamentary preferences; it is unclear whether personalized
defaults would accurately account for variation on these dimensions. 155

152. See sources cited supra note 40.
153. Sheppard, supra note 22, at 1846.
154. Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (2014) (proposing personalized intestacy
provisions).
155. Our current empirical understanding of variation in preferences across these
dimensions is quite limited. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, TEACHER’S MANUAL:
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 2-15 (10th ed. 2017) (“To our knowledge, there has never been
a good study of the fit between intestacy rules and the family structures of varied racial and
ethnic communities. This is a regrettable lacuna in the literature.”). The suggestion that only
a “bit more research” is needed to understand the role of observable characteristics in
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Second, issues surrounding substitution and the lingering role for humans
also apply. First, it is not clear that the development of personalized defaults
should proceed without human intervention. This is especially true given the
evolution of social norms and testamentary preferences. If donative transfers
comprise the data corpus, the predictive results would reflect the preferences
of individuals currently making donative transfers, who are likely to be older.
Individuals who died relatively young could thus be subject to defaults that
reflect norms and preferences that are in the process of falling out of fashion.
While the relative timing of social change and legal change is always a
potential issue, the bottom-up approach of personalized defaults may
exacerbate it. In addition, it is possible that the elegance of the technological
intervention would give way to messy realities as humans attempted to
administer estates with awkward divisions.156 Finally, adoption of these
default rules would require massive doctrinal changes, even if they overcome
challenges regarding UPL. Thus, even predictions for future legal
technologies require empirical grounding.
Conclusion
Technological advances are modifying the practice of law and reshaping
the boundaries between lawyers and clients. Some legal futurists foresee a
bleak future for the legal profession, as the work of lawyers is increasingly
automated. Others are more sanguine, emphasizing the potential for
technology to enhance lawyers’ ability to serve clients. Across this spectrum,
however, scholars espouse the potential of legal technology to increase
access to justice, with DIY estate planning frequently offered as an
illustration. Yet, there are several empirical realities that challenge this
prediction. Human frailties hinder the willingness and ability of many
individuals to engage successfully with new technologies, while market
forces shape the design and availability of technology in ways that may not
address the needs of all. These realities limit the potential for disruptive
technology to diminish the legal profession while expanding access to justice
and illustrates the need to ground our expectations for legal technology in
empirical realities. The future for lawyers and access to justice in the age of
artificial intelligence is bright complicated.

predicting testamentary preferences is quite optimistic. See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note
154, at 1477.
156. That is, unless the personalized defaults are carried out via automated wire transfer
and physical distribution by court-appointed robots.
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